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ABSTRACT  
 
The paper presents an approach for detection of 
spoofing/meaconing signals using the direction-of-arrival 
(DOA) measurements available in a multi-antenna 
navigation receiver. The detection is based on comparison 
and statistically testing of the measured DOAs against the 
expected DOAs. The expected DOAs are computed in the 
receiver using the almanac and ephemeris information 
while performing the estimation of the user position. The 
attitude of the antenna array is assumed to be unknown 
and therefore has to be estimated as well. Consequently, 
the detection of spoofing/meaconing signals using this 
approach is treated as a joint detection/estimation 
problem. The solution to this problem is described in this 
paper. In addition, the performance of the proposed 
approach is analyzed through simulations in exemplary 
artificial scenarios and by processing real DOA 
measurement data collected during measurement 
campaigns. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
Radio frequency interference is one of the major concerns 
for safety-critical applications of global satellite 
navigation systems (GNSSs). This phenomenon can be 
classified into two types of interference: (i) jamming that 
aims to prevent a receiver from using the satellite signals 
for navigation and (ii) spoofing or meaconing aiming to 
fool a receiver, which can result in a wrong position 
and/or time solution. The spoofing and meaconing signals 
can arise intentionally or unintentionally. For example, 
improperly used GPS repeaters/re-radiators which are 
originally meant for improving indoor availability of 
GNSS can act as a source of meaconing [1]. 
 
Until recently, spoofing and meaconing of GNSS signals 
have only been considered relevant and of interest in the 
frame of military applications. However, it turns out that 
this threat also gains more and more attention in other 
fields especially in the context of safety and security 
critical applications. Therefore the reliable detection and 
mitigation of this threat is of major interest for a large 
variety of applications.  
 
Multi-antenna processing in a GNSS receiver is a 
valuable technique for identifying spoofing, meaconing as 
well as multipath signals. The use of such a technique 
allows for identification of the directions of arrival 
(DOAs) of incoming signals with the help of high-
resolution direction finding methods like MUSIC and 
ESPRIT which have accuracies in the order of a few 
degrees or better [2], [3], [4]. As the expected DOAs of 
GNSS signals can be obtained from GNSS almanac data 
[5] or other side information channels, comparing the 
estimated directions of arrival with the expected ones 
allows identifying spoofing/meaconing signals or 
multipath echoes, which typically arrive from directions 
of arrival different from those of the direct GNSS satellite 
signals. Since the DOA estimation delivers results in the 
local coordinate frame of the antenna array, the estimated 
DOAs have to be transformed into a GNSS local geodetic 
coordinate frame before being used for the 
spoofing/meaconing identification. This conversion 
requires sufficiently accurate knowledge of the attitude of 
the receiving antenna array platform. Especially for 
mobile GNSS receivers on vehicles, ships and aircraft the 
autonomous (e.g. without the use of external sensors) 
determination of the attitude of the multi-antenna 
platform is a challenging task, since it needs to be updated 
continuously and instantly even under high dynamics of 
the mobile platform and the presence of 
spoofing/meaconing signals.  
 
This paper solves the aforementioned problem by treating 
the process of spoofing detection and attitude estimation 
as a joint detection/estimation problem. For this reason, it 
is assumed that several GNSS signals are received by a 
multi-antenna receiver where each signal is associated 
with an individual combination of the satellite navigation 
system (e.g. GPS / Galileo etc.) and PRN code. 
Furthermore, at least one direction of arrival is observed 
for each such combination. In case of spoofing, 
meaconing or multipath propagation multiple directions 
of arrival may correspond to a single GNSS signal. In the 
undisturbed case, the attitude determination for the 
antenna array platform could be completed in three 
following steps: In the first step, all directions of arrival 
of the incoming GNSS signals are estimated in the local 
coordinate frame of the antenna array platform with the 
help of the DOA estimation technique. In the second step, 
the expected DOAs of all GNSS signals are determined in 
the local East, North, Up (ENU) Cartesian coordinates by 
using side information like the system almanac. And 
finally in the third step, the attitude of the multi-antenna 
array platform is determined on the basis of the estimated 
DOAs in the local coordinate frame and the expected 
DOAs in the ENU frame. The challenge during this 
process is the fact that spoofing /meaconing signals may 
hamper the correct determination of the attitude and lead 
to wrong attitude estimation results. Moreover, if more 
than one, i.e. 𝑁, different directions of arrival per signal 
are available, obviously 𝑁 − 1 or even all 𝑁 directions 
are not associated with the real line-of-sight propagation 
path between the GNSS satellite and the GNSS receiver 
and, therefore, are useless for attitude determination. 
Thus, a straight sequential process of attitude estimation 
as a first step and the spoofing determination following 
afterwards is not possible.  
 
Within the joint spoofing detection and attitude estimation 
process these restrictions are taken into account. An 
approach with similarities to multiple hypotheses RAIM 
[6] is used where a multitude of hypotheses is followed in 
parallel. Each hypothesis contains an assumption about 
which GNSS signals and corresponding DOAs are 
trustworthy and which are not trustworthy due to 
spoofing, meaconing or simple multipath propagation. For 
each hypothesis an estimate of the attitude of the GNSS 
antenna platform as well as an associated test metric 
indicating likelihood of this hypothesis are determined. 
Based on the test results for several hypotheses the 
following can be determined: (i) the most likely estimate 
of the attitude of the multi-antenna array platform and (ii) 
the most likely decision about which GNSS signals and 
DOAs are correct and which are incorrect due to 
spoofing, meaconing and multipath. The process of 
establishing, tracking and discarding hypotheses as well 
as the estimation of the attitude of the antenna array is an 
iterative procedure.  
 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section of the 
paper is dedicated to the derivation and description of the 
novel joint spoofing detection and attitude estimation 
process. Further in the third section, the potential 
performance of the proposed approach is analyzed by 
simulations using exemplary artificial scenarios. In order 
to assess the performance of the approach in practical 
scenarios, real DOA measurements which have been 
collected during measurement campaigns using the multi-
antenna GNSS receiver developed by the German 
Aerospace Center (DLR) [2] will also be used. Finally, 
the paper will be concluded by summarizing the results of 
this study drawing several conclusions. 
 
 
THEORETICAL DERIVATIONS 
 
The mathematic model for the observations of the 
directions of arrival of satellite signals, which are 
obtained by a DOA estimation technique of the antenna 
array signal processing can be written as follows  
 
𝐃𝑙𝑜𝑐 = 𝐌(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦)𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢 + 𝐍 (1) 
 
where 
𝐃𝑙𝑜𝑐  is a [3 × 𝑁DOA] matrix composed of 𝑁DOA unit 
vectors of directional cosines corresponding to 
the directions of arrival of satellite signals in the 
local coordinate frame of the antenna array. A 
single directional cosine vector is defined as  𝒅�𝑙𝑜𝑐 = [sin𝜃 cos𝜑 , sin𝜃 sin𝜑 , cos 𝜃]T,  
where 𝜃 is an elevation angle and 𝜑 is an 
azimuth angle in the antenna local coordinate 
frame (see Figure 1); 
𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢 is a [3 × 𝑁DOA] matrix composed of unit vectors 
of directional cosines corresponding to the DOAs 
of satellite signals in the user local ENU 
coordinate frame (see Figure 2). The directional 
cosine vector is defined in this coordinate frame 
as follows 
𝒅�𝑒𝑛𝑢 = [cos𝐸𝑙 sin𝐴𝑧 , cos𝐸𝑙 cos𝐴𝑧 , sin𝐸𝑙]T 
where 𝐸𝑙 and 𝐴𝑧 are the elevation and azimuth 
angles, correspondingly, in the ENU coordinate 
frame; 
𝐌(𝑟, 𝑝,𝑦) is a [3 × 3] unitary rotation matrix (see [7], 
p.441) corresponding to the attitude of the 
antenna array defined by three Eulers angles: roll 
𝑟, pitch 𝑝 and yaw 𝑦. These angles are referred 
to the user local ENU coordinate frame; 
𝐍 is a [3 × 𝑁DOA] matrix describing the measurement 
noise effect.   
 
Figure 1: DOA in local antenna coordinate frame  
 
Figure 2: DOA in geodetic East, North, Up (ENU) local 
coordinate frame 
 
The relationship between the antenna coordinate frame 
and the ENU geodetic local coordinate frame is shown in 
Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3: Local antenna and ENU coordinate frames 
Examining the proposed mathematical model, one can see 
that the antenna array attitude can be estimated by solving 
the system of vector-matrix equations for three Euler 
angles in the least squares sense. This system of equations 
is typically overdetermined since at least 4 satellites are 
required to perform the PVT solution. The least squares 
problem is formulated as follows 
 (?̂?, ?̂?, 𝑦�) = arg
𝑟,𝑝,𝑦 min‖𝐌(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦)𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢 − 𝐃𝑙𝑜𝑐‖2 . (2) 
 
The formulation of (2) is equivalent to the following 
minimization problem 
 (?̂?, ?̂?,𝑦�) =   = arg
𝑟,𝑝,𝑦 min trace{(𝐌(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦)𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢 − 𝐃𝑙𝑜𝑐   )T ⋅ (𝐌(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦)𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢 − 𝐃𝑙𝑜𝑐)}. (3) 
 
After performing matrix multiplications, the argument of trace function can be written in the following short form  
 trace{(𝐌(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦)𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢 − 𝐃𝑙𝑜𝑐)T ⋅ (𝐌(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦)𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢 − 𝐃𝑙𝑜𝑐)} =  =  trace{𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢T  𝐌T(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦)𝐌(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦)𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢)} 
−trace{𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢T 𝐌T(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦)𝐃𝑙𝑜𝑐} 
−trace{𝐃𝑙𝑜𝑐T 𝐌(𝑟, 𝑝,𝑦)𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢} +trace{𝐃𝑙𝑜𝑐T 𝐃𝑙𝑜𝑐} 
 
= 2𝑁DOA − 2trace{𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢T 𝐌T(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦)𝐃𝑙𝑜𝑐} (4) 
 
Taking this into account, the solution of the least squares 
problem of (2) leads to the maximization of the following 
cost function 
 (?̂?, ?̂?, 𝑦�) = arg
𝑟,𝑝,𝑦 max  trace{𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢T 𝐌T(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦)𝐃𝑙𝑜𝑐} (5) 
 
or equivalently (?̂?, ?̂?, 𝑦�) =  arg
𝑟,𝑝,𝑦 max trace �𝐌(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦) ⋅ 𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢𝐃𝑙𝑜𝑐T�����
=𝐂
�  (6) 
 
where 𝐂 = 𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢𝐃𝑙𝑜𝑐T . 
 
The maximum of the resulting cost function  J(𝑟, 𝑝,𝑦) = trace{𝐌(𝑟, 𝑝,𝑦)𝐂} of three Euler angles can 
be found by taking partial derivatives of the function and 
solving the following system of equations 
 
⎩
⎪⎪
⎨
⎪⎪
⎧trace�𝜕𝐌(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦)
𝜕𝑟
𝐂� = 0
trace�𝜕𝐌(𝑟, 𝑝,𝑦)
𝜕𝑝
𝐂� = 0
trace�𝜕𝐌(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦)
𝜕𝑦
𝐂� = 0
 (7) 
 
or, in a compact form 
 
�
g𝑟(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦) = 0g𝑝(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦) = 0g𝑦(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦) = 0 (8) 
 
and  
𝐠(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦) = �g𝑟(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦)g𝑝(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦)g𝑦(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦)� = 0. (9) 
 
The components of the vector 𝐠(𝑟, 𝑝,𝑦) in (9) are non-
linear functions of the Euler angles. In order to be able to 
iterative solve the given system of non-linear equations, 
the vector function 𝐠(𝑟, 𝑝,𝑦) can be linearized around the 
neighborhood of some starting point (𝑟0, 𝑝0,𝑦0) using the 
Taylor expansion to the first order: 
 
𝐠(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦) ≅  
𝐠(𝑟0, 𝑝0, 𝑦0) + [𝛁𝐠T(𝑟0, 𝑝0, 𝑦0) ]T �𝑟 − 𝑟0𝑝 − 𝑝0
𝑦 − 𝑦0
� (10) 
 
where 𝛁 is a vector differential operator defined as 
 
𝛁 = � 𝜕
𝜕𝑟
𝜕
𝜕𝑝
𝜕
𝜕𝑦
�
T
 (11) 
 
so that the gradient term [𝛁𝐠T(𝑟0, 𝑝0,𝑦0) ]T produces the 
following [3 × 3]  matrix  
 
 [𝛁𝐠T(𝑟0, 𝑝0, 𝑦0) ]T = 
=
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
∂gr(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦)
∂𝑟
∂gr(r, p, y)
∂𝑝
∂g𝑟(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦)
∂𝑦
∂g𝑝(𝑟, 𝑝,𝑦)
∂𝑟
∂g𝑝(𝑟, 𝑝,𝑦)
∂𝑝
∂g𝑝(𝑟, 𝑝,𝑦)
∂𝑦
∂g𝑦(𝑟, 𝑝,𝑦)
∂𝑟
∂g𝑦(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦)
∂𝑝
∂g𝑦(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦)
∂𝑦 ⎦
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎥
⎤
. (12) 
 
The iterative formulation for the solution of the problem 
at hand is then as follows 
 
�
𝑟𝑛+1
𝑝𝑛+1
𝑦𝑛+1
� = 
�
𝑟𝑛
𝑝𝑛
𝑦𝑛
� − ([𝛁𝐠T(𝑟0, 𝑝0, 𝑦0) ]T)−1𝐠(𝑟𝑛 , 𝑝𝑛 , 𝑦𝑛). (13)  
The starting point (𝑟0, 𝑝0,𝑦0) for the iterative solution in 
(13) can be obtained by solving the following least 
squares problem for an estimation of the rotation matrix 
𝐌� (𝑟, 𝑝,𝑦): 
 
𝐌� (𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦) = arg
𝐌�
min�𝐌� (𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦)𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢 − 𝐃𝑙𝑜𝑐�2 . (14) 
 
The formulation of (14) is obtained by neglecting the side 
condition 𝐌(𝑟, 𝑝,𝑦)𝐌T(𝑟, 𝑝,𝑦) = 𝐈 which originates 
from the definition of a rotation matrix. The first 
estimation of the Euler angles can be obtained by using 
the elements of the resulting matrix 𝐌� (𝑟, 𝑝,𝑦) as follows 
[7]: 
 tan 𝑟0 = −𝑀�13𝑀�33 tan𝑝0 = − 𝑀�23
�𝑀�21
2 + 𝑀�222  
tan𝑦0 = −𝑀�21𝑀�22. 
(15) 
 
The Gauss-Markov least squares solution of (12) is given 
by   
𝐌� (𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦) = 𝐃𝑙𝑜𝑐𝐑𝑁−1𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢T (𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢𝐑𝑁−1𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢T )−1, (16)   
where 𝐑𝑁  is the covariance matrix of (12) the 
measurement noise.  
 
The least squares problem formulated by (12) for 
estimating the rotation matrix is known in the literature as 
Wahba's problem. A computationally effective solution to 
this problem, and therefore also for determining the 
starting point of (11), is available by using the singular 
value decomposition (SVD) technique as described in [8]. 
 
By using equations (13), (15) and (16) the antenna array 
attitude can be determined as described above for a given 
set of DOA antenna measurements 𝐃𝑙𝑜𝑐  and the 
corresponding set of DOAs 𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢 calculated with the 
GNSS system almanac data. The quality of the obtained 
solution for the attitude can be assessed using the sum of 
squares of errors (SSE) test statistics similar to how it is 
used with receiver autonomous integrity monitoring 
(RAIM) techniques [9], [10]. The SSE metric is defined 
as follows 
 
𝑆𝑆𝐸 = trace{[𝐌(𝑟, 𝑝,𝑦)𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢 − 𝐃𝑙𝑜𝑐]T ⋅ 
𝐑𝑁
−1 [𝐌(𝑟, 𝑝, 𝑦)𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢 − 𝐃𝑙𝑜𝑐]}, (17) 
 
where the inverse of the covariance matrix of the 
measurement noise 𝐑𝑁−1   is used for normalizing 
individual error components (i.e. the residuals of the least 
squares solution). 
 
If the antenna measurements for GNSS signal directions 
of arrival and the corresponding predicted DOAs are 
consistent with each other, the residuals of the least 
squares solution are unbiased and have zero mean. In this 
case the 𝑆𝑆𝐸 metric as defined by (17) follows a central 
chi-squared distribution with 𝑘 =  (2𝑁DOA − 3) degrees 
of freedom. In another case, when some measured 
directions of arrival are not consistent with the expected 
ones, the residuals of the least squares solution become 
biased and the 𝑆𝑆𝐸 metric follows a non-central chi-
squared distribution with the same number of degrees of 
freedom as in the error-free case but with some non-zero 
non-centrality parameter 𝜆: 
 H0(no error):  𝑆𝑆𝐸~𝜒2(𝑘) H1(error):        𝑆𝑆𝐸~𝜒′2(𝑘, 𝜆) 
𝑘 =  (2𝑁DOA − 3) 
𝜆 = � �Δ𝑛
𝜎𝑛
�
2
𝑁DOA
𝑛=1
 
(18) 
 
where  
Δ𝑛 is a bias in the 𝑛-th DOA measurement performed 
by the antenna array, this bias is expressed in (18) 
as an angle 𝜓 between two direction cosines 
vectors of the measured DOA 𝒅�𝑙𝑜𝑐 and the 
expected “almanac” DOA 𝒅�𝑒𝑛𝑢. This angle 
between can be calculated as  
 
𝜓 = arccos�𝒅�𝑙𝑜𝑐T 𝒅�𝑒𝑛𝑢�. (19) 
 
𝜎𝑛 is the standard deviation of the 𝑛-th DOA 
measurement error referred to the angle 𝜓 between 
the vectors 𝒅�𝑙𝑜𝑐 and 𝒅�𝑒𝑛𝑢.  
 
Examples of probability density functions (pdfs) of the 
𝑆𝑆𝐸 test statistics for H0 and H1 cases are shown in 
Figure 4. These theoretical results are obtained assuming 
availability of DOA antenna array measurements for 7 
GNSS satellites. The assumed standard deviation 𝜎𝑛 of 
the angular errors of DOA measurements is 3°. 
As it can be observed in Figure 4, the pdfs for H0 and H1 
hypotheses becomes clearly separated at values of the 
non-centrality parameter 𝜆 = 49 or larger. If a single 
inconsistent signal is observed under adopted assumptions 
(i.e. number of DOA measurements, std of measurement 
error etc.) this signal with an inconsistent direction of 
arrival can be effectively detected if the angular 
separation between the actual DOA and the expected 
“almanac” DOA is larger than 21° (𝜎𝑛 = 3°,
Δ𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝜎𝑛⁄ = 7). The detection of the 
spoofer/meaconing signal can be, for example, performed 
by using the Neyman-Pearson criterion [11], i.e. by 
setting a detection threshold defined by some desired false 
alarm rate. 
 
 
Figure 4: Probability distribution functions of 𝑆𝑆𝐸 metric 
without outliers (H0) and with outliers (H1) in  
direction of arrival measurements for 7 satellites 
 
The process of the joint attitude determination and 
spoofer (meaconing, multipath) detection/exclusion can 
be performed in following steps: 
 
1. Test the hypothesis H0:  
• Obtain an estimation of the antenna attitude 
together with the associated 𝑆𝑆𝐸 test statistics. 
• Compare the test statistics against a predefined 
threshold. The threshold can be defined, for 
example, by a desired false alarm rate using the 
Neyman-Pearson criterion.  
• If the test statistics is below or equal to the 
threshold, the process is terminated. The 
determination of the antenna attitude is declared to 
be successful, no erroneous DOAs are detected.  
• If the 𝑆𝑆𝐸 test statistics is larger than the 
threshold, the assumed number of erroneous DOA 
measurements is set to 1, i.e. 𝑁𝑒𝑟𝑟 = 1, and the 
next steps are carried out.  
2. Form 𝑁ℎ𝑦𝑝 sub-sets (see ) of DOA measurements 
corresponding to all possible H1 hypotheses for the 
given number 𝑁𝑒𝑟𝑟 , i.e. 𝑁ℎ𝑦𝑝 = �𝑁𝐷𝑂𝐴𝑁𝑒𝑟𝑟 �. 
3. Find the sub-set that delivers the minimum 𝑆𝑆𝐸 test 
statistics: 
• Estimate the antenna attitude together with the 
associated SSE test statistics for each sub-set. 
Sub-Set #1 Sub-Set #2 Sub-Set #Nhyp
. . .
 
Figure 5: Example of sub-sets of DOA measurements  
for 𝑁𝑒𝑟𝑟 =  2, 𝑁DOA =  10 and 𝑁ℎ𝑦𝑝 =  45 
 
 
• Update the threshold by taking into account 
current value of 𝑁𝑒𝑟𝑟 . 
• If the obtained minimum test statistics is below or 
equal to the threshold, the process is terminated. 
The determination of the antenna attitude is 
declared to be successful. The GNSS signals which 
are excluded in the “winning” sub-set are reported 
as suspicious. 
• If the 𝑆𝑆𝐸 test statistics is larger than the 
threshold, the assumed number of erroneous DOA 
measurements is increased by 1,  
i.e. 𝑁𝑒𝑟𝑟 = 𝑁𝑒𝑟𝑟 + 1. 
4. Check of 𝑁𝑒𝑟𝑟: 
• If 𝑁𝑒𝑟𝑟 ≤ 𝑁𝑒𝑟𝑟,𝑀𝐴𝑋 , the process returns to the 
step 2. 𝑁𝑒𝑟𝑟,𝑀𝐴𝑋   is the maximum number of 
simultaneously erroneous DOA measurements to 
be considered.  
• If 𝑁𝐷𝑂𝐴 − 𝑁𝑒𝑟𝑟 < 4, the estimations of the Euler 
angles obtained with (14) and (15) are not 
sufficiently accurate for solving (13). The process 
has to be terminated. The determination of the 
antenna attitude and detection of potential 
spoofing/meaconing are declared to be failed. 
• If 𝑁𝑒𝑟𝑟 > 𝑁𝑒𝑟𝑟,𝑀𝐴𝑋 , the process is terminated with 
the same outcome as above. 
 
First initial performance analysis of proposed approach as 
well as the verification of its software implementation 
have been carried out with the help of Monte-Carlo 
simulations in Matlab. The obtained results will be 
presented in the next section. 
 
 
PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT 
 
The Monte-Carlo software simulations have been carried 
out using an exemplary GPS satellite constellation that is 
shown in Figure 6 in form of a skyplot. The directions to 
the ten satellites in the skyplot are used to form the matrix 
𝐃𝑒𝑛𝑢 in (1) that has in this case the size of [3 × 10]. 
 
 
Figure 6: GPS satellite constellation as skyplot in user’s 
ENU coordinate frame 
 
The simulated DOA measurements for all 10000 Monte-
Carlo runs are shown in the skyplot in Figure 7. Please 
note that the actual satellite positions observed by the 
antenna array (marked with red circles in Figure 7) are 
different to the satellite positions in Figure 6. This is due 
to the attitude of the antenna array that was adopted in the 
simulations as follows: roll angle of 5°, pitch angle of 
10°, and yaw angle of 90°. The simulated DOA 
measurements of a single Monte-Carlo run were used to 
form the matrix 𝐃𝑙𝑜𝑐  in (1). 
 
In order to bring the simulated direction of arrival 
measurements closer to practice, the DOA measurement 
errors have been simulated with varying standard 
deviation. The deviation was assumed to depend on the 
elevation of the satellite in the antenna coordinate frame 
and followed the curve shown in Figure 8. This 
approximation is based on the fact that the reception 
characteristics of planar antenna arrays lead to elevation 
dependent performance of the DOA estimation. This 
effect was also observed in the measurement data 
collected with DLR’s GALANT receiver [3], [4] that 
utilizes a 2-by-2 flat square antenna array and a 2-
dimensional unitary ESPRIT algorithm for the direction 
of arrival estimation [12], [13]. 
 
Figure 7: Simulated DOA measurements. 
Adopted Euler angles are: 𝑟 = 5°, 𝑝 = 10°, 𝑦 = 90° 
 
 
Figure 8: Approximation of dependency of DOA 
measurement errors on satellite elevation in antenna 
coordinate frame 
 
The results for error of estimation of the Euler angles are 
shown in Figure 9 and Table 1. As it can be observed 
there, the attitude determination delivers in tested scenario 
a bias-free estimation of the Euler angles. The standard 
deviations of the estimation errors have not exceeded 1° 
for any of the Euler angles.  
 
 
Figure 9: Estimation errors for Euler angles  
defining the attitude of antenna array  
 
 
 Yaw Pitch Roll 
Mean (∘) -0,022 0.001 0.006 
Std. (∘) 0.839 0.804 0.974 
Table 1: Mean and standard deviations of attitude 
estimates obtained for simulated DOA measurements 
 
The probability density function of the obtained 𝑆𝑆𝐸 test 
metrics for all 10000 Monte-Carlo runs in shown in 
Figure 10. As it can be observed in this figure, the pdf 
estimated from the simulation results matches well the 
expected theoretical pdf of chi-squared distribution with 
17 degrees of freedom (see (18)). 
 
 
Figure 10: Pdf of 𝑆𝑆𝐸 test metric 
 
In addition, the Monte-Carlo simulations have been 
repeated again with the same set-up except of introducing 
a bias in DOA measurements for the satellite SV17 in 
order to model the occurrence of false (spoofing) signal. 
The measurements were biased by -10° for azimuth 𝜑 and 
−10° for elevation 𝜃 (see Figure 11).  
 
 
Figure 11: Simulated DOA measurements. 
DOA measurements for SV17 are intentionally biased tp 
model false signal 
 
The introduced bias corresponds to moving away the 
directional cosines vector 𝒅�𝑙𝑜𝑐 that defines the estimated 
direction to SV17 by about 12.5°, i.e. Δ𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑒𝑟 = 12,5° 
and  �Δ𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝜎𝑛⁄ �2 = 34.17. The corresponding pdfs of 
the 𝑆𝑆𝐸 test statistics for H0 and H1 hypotheses are 
shown in Figure 12 where good match between the 
simulation results and predicted theoretical curves can be 
observed. 
 
 
Figure 12: Pdfs of 𝑆𝑆𝐸 test metric for H0 and H1 
hypotheses 
 
The means and standard deviations of the estimation 
errors of the Euler angles obtained in the Monte-Carlo 
simulation with the systematically biased DOA 
measurement for SV17 are presented in Table 2. Since 
this wrongful DOA measurement was detected and 
excluded, the estimation errors of the Euler angles stay 
un-biased. However, the standard deviations of the 
estimated Euler angles slightly rise when comparing to 
the corresponding figures in Table 1. This is due to the 
fact that the number of DOA measurements used now for 
the attitude determination has decreased. 
 
 
 Yaw Pitch Roll 
Mean (∘) -0.023 0.077 0.052 
Std. (∘) 0.912 0.964 1.071 
Table 2: Mean and standard deviations of attitude 
estimates by using simulated DOA measurements with 
one biased measurement 
 
In order to validate the assumptions about the underlying 
statistics of the DOA measurements, the DLR’s multi-
antenna receiver GALANT [2] is used. Though a 
simplified version of the attitude determination algorithm 
described above has been already implemented in real-
time in the receiver, the results presented further were 
obtained in post-processing by using the recorded data. 
The GALANT receiver supports the NMEA 0183 
communication interface that is primarily used to 
visualize the receiver state parameters in a graphical user 
interface (GUI). Several proprietary messages have been 
added to the standard set of NMEA messages in order to 
support the transmission of the state information 
regarding the advanced array processing functions of the 
receiver (adaptive beamforming, direction of arrival 
estimation) as well as to allow changing of the receiver 
settings through the GUI. All data required for the attitude 
determination are already available in the transmitted 
NMEA messages. A message type GSV contains the 
DOA information derived for a current user position from 
the GNSS almanac data. A proprietary NMEA message is 
used to transmit the estimated DOAs for all GNSS signals 
in track. The messages of these two types were 
continuously recorded with the update rate of 1 Hz for 
GSV message and 10 Hz for the proprietary message over 
approximately six hours. The antenna array of the 
GALANT receiver during these tests was mounted 
statically on the roof of the DLR Institute of 
Communications and Navigation in Oberpfaffenhofen.  
 
Figure 13 shows the results for estimated roll, pitch and 
yaw angles whose estimations are based on the recorded 
real-time measurements as described above. The update 
rate of the attitude estimation corresponds to the update 
rate of recorded GSV, i.e. 1 Hz. The mean and standard 
deviations are shown in Table 3.  
 
 
Figure 13: Attitude estimates from post processing of  
real-time DOA measurements 
 
 
 Yaw Pitch Roll 
Mean (∘) 153.840 0.525 2.843 
Std. (∘) 1.208 1.608 1.278 
Table 3: Mean and standard deviations of the attitude 
estimates performed on real DOA measurements 
 
In Table 3 it can be observed, that the standard deviations 
are slightly higher than the assumed parameters of the 
Monte-Carlo simulations from above. Furthermore, the 
results show that the antenna is mounted only with a small 
inclination, but with a yaw angle of about 153°.  
 
Further results of the post-processing contain the 
estimated directions of arrival of GNSS signals which 
were corrected by taking into account the estimated 
attitude of the antenna array (see Table 3). 
 
As an example, the DOA results for GPS SV 06 are 
shown in Figure 14. The first two plots show azimuth and 
elevation angles, where the estimated DOAs and the 
expected “almanac” DOAs are shown in each plot. As it 
can be seen in these plots, the estimations of azimuth and 
elevation angles of arrival are very well centered on the 
expected values. This indicates that the proposed attitude 
determination algorithm delivers effectively bias-free 
results.  
 
The last plot in Figure 14 shows the angle between the 
vectors of directional cosines corresponding to the 
estimated and almanac DOAs as defined by (19).As it can 
be observed in this plot, the variance of the DOA 
estimation error depends on the elevation of the satellite. 
Two factors can be responsible for this effect: (i) lower 
elevation angles result in less signal power and (ii) the 
planar array geometry limits the resolution available in 
the direction of arrival estimation. 
 
 
Figure 14: DOA estimation results of SV 06 
 
The results of post-processing indicate an important effect 
that occurs in a practical system and needs to be carefully 
taken into account. This effect consists in that for very 
low elevation angles, the estimated azimuth angles may 
jump by approximately 180°. A typical behavior of the 
estimated DOA for a satellite signal experiencing this 
effect is shown in Figure 15 for GPS SV 16. The exact 
reason for this behavior has to be carefully investigated. 
One of the most probable reasons is the mismatch 
between the underlying signal model of the ESPRIT 
algorithm that assumes perfectly identical antenna 
reception characteristics of all array elements and the 
actual physical characteristics of the array elements which 
may be significantly far from being identical due to 
mutual coupling effect.  
 
 
Figure 15: Jumps of azimuth angle in DOA measurements 
 
Because such azimuth angle jumps are treated like a 
multipath or spoofing effect, the corresponding GNSS 
signals and their erroneous DOAs are excluded from the 
process of attitude estimation by the proposed algorithm. 
The effect of identification of inconsistent DOAs and 
their exclusion on the number of the DOA measurements 
used for the attitude estimation process is shown in Figure 
16. 
 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this paper, an approach to joint spoofing detection and 
antenna array attitude determination has been proposed. It 
has been shown that the GNSS signals with inconsistent 
directions of arrival, e.g. spoofing, meaconing or 
multipath echoes, can be detected and excluded from the 
attitude determination process. The detection and 
exclusion are carried out in the way that has many 
similarities with the multi-hypotheses RAIM techniques. 
Due to this, the potentially achievable level of 
performance in term of spoofing/meaconing detection can 
be easily assessed. 
 
Simulation results demonstrating potentially achievable 
level of the performance in term of antenna array attitude 
determination have been presented. The performance of 
the proposed technique in real environment has been 
E
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angles
assessed using DOA-estimation data collected with 
DLR’s proprietary multi-antenna receiver system. 
 
The proposed approach delivers promising results. The 
performance in real environments has to be analyzed in 
more detail, which will be the topic of further 
investigations. In addition, the following research topics 
can be addressed in the next studies:  
(i) improving the DOA estimation more accurate 
modeling of measurement errors at low elevations; 
(ii) considering the use of sequential estimation; 
(iii) making use of aiding by non-GNSS sensors. 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Number of DOA measurements used for 
attitude determination 
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